A Social Psychological Perspective: Social Identity Theory

By Alexandra Shaitan, PhD.

Social Identity Theory (SIT) in conjunction with self-categorisation theory was first developed by social psychologists Tajfel and Turner (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) in the late twentieth century, and has since positioned itself as a rather dominant and influential model for analysing linguistic identity. The SIT theory is an umbrella term that encompasses a single in-depth theory of group behaviour and the underlying cognitive processes of intergroup and group phenomena. Tajfel (1981: 255) refers to social identity as “that part of an individual’s concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.” This definition, in turn, suggests that social identity has two underlying features: a strong belief that individuals belong to a certain group (e.g., “I am a Japanese-American”) and the value that people place on being the member of such a group (s) (e.g., “I am proud to be biracial”). To put it differently, people define their own identities in relation to social groups where such identifications function to create and enhance positive self-identity.

Whilst Tajfel’s (1981) definition of social identity had been widely applied across disciplines, it was nevertheless subjected to some criticism. Joseph (2004: 76), as an example, points to the five positions encapsulated in this definition. In particular, he shows that Tajfel’s (1981) definition foreshadows that: firstly, social identity resides within an individual rather than being a part of a social group; 2) secondly, it is entirely a self-conceptualised entity, rather than any social categories one may choose to identify with or self-ascribe him/herself unto; thirdly, the fact of membership is the essential thing, rather than anything having to do with the nature of the group itself; fourthly, an individual’s own knowledge of the membership, and the particular emotional/psychological value they attach to it – completely ‘subjective’ factors –are what matter the most; and lastly, emotional significance is not some trivial side effect of the identity belonging but an integral part of it.

Further, Oshima (2014: 25) argues that “it takes certain process and period of time to adjust social identity and establish membership in a society” (p. 25). Others, (e.g., Ericksen, 2001; Kelman, 2001) argue that it is too individualistic in that its primary focus rests on how the individual approaches his/her group membership. They claim that, for example, ethnic and national identities are not always chosen individually, rather, such identities are constantly (re) negotiated and (re) assigned in specific sociocultural contexts. Hegemonic discourses, master narratives and sociocultural discourses circulating in a particular society are all salient components in forming one’s national and ethnic identities. Therefore, the authors suggest to view social identity not only as an individualistic entity, but also as something that is partly the product of a sociocultural environment one is a member of.

In the same manner, Turner and Oakes (1986: 250) propose to view social identity as a ’socially structured field’ within the individual mind and an important element of the psychological or subjective processes of society. It is a stratified, so to say, mechanism whereby society forms the psychology of its members to pursue its goals and conflicts (e.g., ‘citizens’, ‘Americans’, ‘Irish republicans’, ‘conservatives’, ‘socialists’, or ‘Catholics’). It can thus be observed that one’s social identity is formed through the psychological attachments and the development of strong sense of belonging and self-categorisation which become part and parcel of one’s self-concept and self-image.

Another crucial component of self-identification pioneered via the SIT is related to self-categorisation. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979; 1986), placing oneself into a certain societal group category triggers a tendency of developing in-group favouritism over the out-group. Through the on-going psychological processes of evaluation, comparison and identification, people may (re) assess their membership positively or negatively in comparison and contrast to out-group members (McEntee-Atalianis, 2019). Whilst the society assigns a degree of high/low value to different social groups by deciding which social categories are more/less valuable, the (re) assessment and (re) evaluation of the in-group membership by the individual will depend on how that certain group is categorised and viewed by the society. If the group is highly valued by the public, then in-group favouritism and high personal regard will be an expected outcome. If, however, one self-categorises with a group that is socially devalued, then the individual might seek membership of alternative group (s) where he/she can acquire and maintain a positive identity which is at the heart of the SIT (Shaitan & McEntee-Atalianis, 2017).

Can this process then be related to what Gee (1999: 68-74) refers to as a cultural evaluative model? Gee (1999) notes that people deploy evaluative model to consciously or unconsciously judge themselves and others. Such evaluations guide their further actions and interactions in society. He also shows that cultural models circulating in a given society mirror individuals’ lived experiences and societal positions in the world. Such cultural models actually project onto that world, from where we “stand” (where we are socially positioned), certain viewpoints about what is right and wrong, and what can or cannot be done to solve problems in the world. In other words, cultural models project individuals’ cognitive representations of sociocultural environments they have been participants of.

A more recent debate pertaining to the SIT is raised by Ashmore, Deaux & McLaughlin-Volpe (2004) who propose a shift in terminology be made from social identity to collective identity. They rationalise their main arguments by presenting two primary reasons. Firstly, they argue that all aspects of self are socially influenced. Therefore, regarding identity as social is not to distinguish it from other forms of identification, such as personal or relational, that are also inherently social in origin. Secondly, the results of an extensive interdisciplinary literature review conducted by the authors in different fields and subdisciplines reveal “the connotations of social identity are more numerous and potentially more problematic than are those of collective identity” (Ashmore, et.al. 2004: 81). Whilst not disregarding the ambiguity surrounding the concept of “collective identity”, the authors clarify that they use the terminology in relation to an “individual” rather than a group. Nevertheless, the proposed conceptualising framework of collective identity includes the elements of self-identification such as: self-categorisation, evaluation, importance, attachment and sense of interdependence, social embeddedness, behavioral involvement, and content and meaning. Each element is assigned a different label in order to identify what appear to be conceptually equivalent constructs. Finally, the potential links between elements and outcomes and how context moderates these relationships are also revealed.

However, it can be argued that the above-mentioned elements of self-identification cannot be performed by an individual in a vacuum, rather they are mainly performed in comparison and contrast within the societal stratification of a particular sociocultural context: members of a certain group may define, evaluate, judge, accept and reject whilst simultaneously being defined, evaluated, judged, accepted and/or rejected by others. This repetitive ‘ping-pong’ cycle is not fixed or static, rather it is an on-going work-in-progress process that necessitates people to be engaged in ever-evolving social-identity-work production.

This view is reinforced by Kraus (2006) who suggests to view social identity as a hybridity by examining it through a lens of an individual construction of belonging and situative negotiation of belonging. That is to say, social identity construction is not only preoccupied with the I and an abstract ‘other’ or a given hierarchy of identities (e.g., class, nation, gender), rather it places the main focus on the individual’s possession of a multitude of attachments that must be managed in their relation to one another. Therefore, the primary goal of social identity construction is to “situatively sustain the identity process, to answer the questions of belonging and to produce “readability” for oneself as well as for others” (p. 108). Secondly, Kraus (2006: 108) shows that people do not simply choose affiliations, rather, they have to negotiate them with others and are positioned within them by others. The key argument being is that belonging must be negotiated, tested, confirmed, rejected, or qualified again and again situatively by means of storytelling as a means of constructing social bonds.

Not to overshadow the salience of the SIT and its application in the western contexts, Yuki’s (2003) comparative study involving Japanese and North American participants shows, however, that intergroup comparison and depersonalised representation of the collective self may not apply to the East Asian context as they do not accurately represent the group behaviour of the East Asians. He offers an intragroup relational model, as an alternative model, which stipulates that “the goal of East Asian group behaviours is to maintain mutually beneficial relationship with fellow in-group members based primarily on the self as the relational unit and on the awareness of one’s in-groups as networks of relationships” (Yuki, 2003: 177). In addition, the findings reveal that cognitions at both the intergroup level (homogeneity and relative status) and the intragroup level (sociometric knowledge) can affect individuals’ group behavior.

To summarise the above-mentioned discussion, social identity theory is based on theoretical principles proposed by Tajfel and Turner (2004) which illuminate the founding assumptions surrounding the SIT. Namely, individuals strive to achieve or to maintain positive social identity. Secondly, positive social identity is based to a large extent on favourable comparisons that can be made between the in-group and some relevant outgroups: the in-group must be perceived as positively differentiated or distinct from the relevant out-groups. Lastly, when social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive either to leave their existing group and join some more positively distinct group and/or to make their existing group more positively distinct (pp. 283-284).

Whilst the debate on the SIT applicability continues to attract researchers across a variety of disciplines, we think that SIT allows us to explore how mixed-race individuals position themselves across bi/multi-racial-ethnic and cultural identities. As succinctly surmised by Kraus (2006), “social identity is a story without a closure constantly open to change to the continual rearranging and reaffirming of one’s selves, testing and negotiation their interconnection” (p. 104).

To conclude, whilst social identity theory underscores cognitive processes of social identity construction, more recently researchers propose to view it as social practices performed in discourse (Verkuyten, 2005) whereas discourse can be characterised as “small stories” (Bamberg 2005: 223).